For most of their respective existences, reliabilism and evidentialism (that is, process reliabilism and mentalist evidentialism) have been rivals. They are generally viewed as incompatible, even antithetical, theories of justification.
The Concept of Evidence in Evidentialism
A theory of justification that calls itself "evidentialism" and makes evidence possession its focus can reasonably be asked to explain which concept of evidence it means to invoke. If the only viable concept of evidence available to it introduces elements from a "foreign" approach such as reliabilism, this should provide some motivation toward a synthesis or unification with that approach. This is the situation facing evidentialism, as I argue in this section.
In an overview of possible conceptions of evidence, Thomas Kelly (2006) offers several conceptions worthy of attention. First, evidence may be understood as "that which justifies belief." As Jaegwon Kim puts it, "When we talk of 'evidence' in an epistemological sense we are talking about justification: one thing is 'evidence' for another just in case the first tends to enhance the reasonableness or justification of the second" (1988: 390-391) . Can this be the sense of the term Feldman and Conee have in mind? Not if their evidentialist theory is intended to provide an analysis or explanatory account of justification. Yet, clearly, this is what their evidentialist theory, as expressed in [EJ] , is intended to provide. If 'evidence' is defined as "that which justifies belief," then the definition of 'justified' in terms of 'evidence', as proposed in [EJ] , is circular and unhelpful.
Next consider a conception of evidence proposed by Timothy Williamson (2000) , in which knowledge is equivalent to evidence. At any rate, according to Williamson, all items of evidence are pieces of knowledge and vice-versa. Could Feldman and Conee avail themselves of the sense of 'evidence' in which evidence is equivalent to knowledge? This poses the same problem of circularity as the first definition. Feldman and Conee hold that 'knowledge' is to be analyzed in terms of justification, which, of course, is analyzed in terms of evidence. 2 In light of these commitments, it would again be circular to analyze or define 'evidence' in terms of 'knowledge'.
Another conception of evidence Kelly considers is evidence "as a guide to truth."
In other words, something is evidence for p just in case it is a reliable sign, symptom, or mark of the truth of p. This is an appealing conception of evidence, which makes sense of the term's use in many walks of life. In criminal law, it is plausible that what a court admits as evidence should be items that (when properly interpreted) are reliable guides to truth, or signs of that for which they are taken to be evidence. Similarly, in science the reading of a gauge or instrument is evidence for a certain object's having property F just in case the reading is a reliable indicator of the object's possessing F.
Is this definition one that Feldman and Conee could adopt? It is certainly compatible with certain strands of their approach. There is no looming circularity of the sort that besets the first two definitions. Furthermore, it is compatible with Feldman and
Conee's mentalism about evidence, because mental states, events, and processes often qualify as indicators of the truths for which they are (ostensible) evidence. At least this is so if we don't inhabit an evil-demon-world and are not otherwise badly deceived about the actual world. When it visually appears to someone that there is a computer monitor before him, this visual state is usually a reliable sign or indicator that a computer monitor is before him. When a person has an ostensible memory impression that she ate oatmeal for breakfast this morning, the memory impression usually indicates that she did eat oatmeal this morning. Under the truth-indicator conception of evidence, it looks like these two experiences will constitute (prima facie) evidence for just the propositions one would expect them to be evidence for -and that Feldman and Conee take them to be evidence for. So far, then, the reliable indicator interpretation of evidence is one that Feldman and Conee should find congenial.
Feldman and Conee would probably resist this suggestion, of course, for two closely related reasons. First, they hold that even in an evil-demon world a visual experience as of a computer monitor is evidence for the presence of a computer monitor (Feldman, 1985) , and one is justified in believing that a computer monitor is present even though such visual experiences are not reliable indicators of the presence of a monitor in such a world. A related problem is that truth-indicatorship properties vary from world to world, so that what is evidence for what is contingent under this approach. But Feldman and Conee want evidential relationships to be necessary.
It should not be assumed, however, that truth-indicatorship in the world of an example is the optimal interpretation of the reliable indicatorship approach. Instead, truth-indicatorship relationships might be rigidified so that they are fixed by the correlations that obtain in the actual world. If this approach is adopted, even a cognizer in an evil-demon world will be justified in his perceptual beliefs (see Goldman, 2008a ).
Comesana embeds roughly this approach in a two-dimensional semantics (Comesana, 2002 ; forthcoming) and calls it "indexical reliabilism." In particular, following Stalnaker's (1978) version of two-dimensional semantics, there are two different propositions associated with any attribution of justification: the "diagonal proposition", which implies that the belief is produced by a method that is reliable in the world where it the belief is held; and the "horizontal" proposition, which implies that the belief is produced by a process that is reliable in whichever world the proposition is considered.
The latter interpretation might be acceptable to evidentialists, both in terms of allowing perception-based justifiedness in an evil-demon world and in terms of complying with the necessity constraint on the evidential relation.
In this section we have noted that there are multiple conceptions, or definitions, of "evidence." Thus, evidentialism owes us an indication of what it means by "evidence."
Until we are told how to interpret the term 'evidence' for purposes of this theory, we cannot begin to assess its (extensional) adequacy. As we have seen, moreover, some definitions of 'evidence' are not viable for evidentialism because of circularity. The only definition I am able to pinpoint that does not suffer from this liability employs some sort of reliability notion. Could evidentialism adopt this definition? Pure evidentialism, understood as a rival or opponent of reliabilism, could not adopt it. But when we consider the prospects of a hybrid approach, this might be an attractive option. Mental states would serve as the items of evidence under the hybrid theory, but they would qualify as items of evidence (ultimately) because they --or their ilk --stand in reliableindicator relationships to facts in the world. Although Feldman and Conee themselves are unlikely to applaud this maneuver, other epistemologists in search of the best overall theory might find it a congenial solution to the definitional problem.
Justification and Fittingness with Non-Doxastic Evidence
Two notions of justifiedness are commonly recognized in the literature:
propositional and doxastic justifiedness. Feldman and Conee's (1985) (1985/2004: 93) Obviously, mentalist evidentialism owes us an account of fittingness. Two types of cases need to be covered, fittingness as applied to inferential justifiedness and fittingness as applied to non-inferential justifiedness. I begin with non-inferential justifiedness.
Feldman and Conee certainly appear to believe in non-inferential justifiedness.
Feldman's textbook Epistemology (2003) seems to favor (modest) foundationalism as the best approach to justification, and foundationalism is committed to basic justifiedness, which is non-inferential. Conee's paper "The Basic Nature of Epistemic Justification" (1988/2004) , on the other hand, appears to favor a combination of foundationalism and coherentism. Conee agrees, however, that such a theory must acknowledge foundational experiences (1988/2004: 43) . Thus, both theories seem to be committed to some strand of non-doxastic justifiedness, and, given evidentialism, this must arise from some nondoxastic species of fittingness. 4 Non-doxastic fittingness is what I examine in the present section.
Let us begin with non-inferential beliefs based on perceptual experience or introspection. Almost all foundationalists will accept introspectively-based beliefs (at least some of them) as non-inferentially justified. Modest foundationalists, such as Feldman and Conee, also accept some perceptual beliefs as non-inferentially justified.
The question is how, in detail, evidentialism can handle these cases of justifiedness. In both cases the problem I have in mind may be called the selection problem. Some perceptually based beliefs are justified and other beliefs are unjustified; similarly for introspectively based beliefs. How can mentalist evidentialism explain which ones are which?
Feldman (2003) is fully aware of the problem and provides a good example.
Maurice enters a room, sees a 12-year-old when the contents of a belief are "closer" to the direct contents of the experience, they are more apt to be properly based on experience. This approach assumes that proper responsiveness is always a matter of content matching, but this cannot be right. If I form a belief that this mental state I am internally demonstrating is a desire, the belief may well be justified. But the belief's content --that this mental event is a desire --need not match the desire's content, which could be anything, and, in particular, need not concern a desire.
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Another move Feldman makes is to appeal to the subject's training. He uses this to explain the difference in well-foundedness between an expert and a novice birdwatcher, who both identify a certain bird as of type X. The expert, says Feldman, should be credited with a well-founded belief, the novice (who was just guessing) with an illfounded one. But how, exactly, is their respective training relevant? A simple and direct answer comes from process reliabilism. The relevance of training, quite simply, is that it makes the bird expert's bird-spotting judgments consistently come out true; the absence of relevant training makes the novice's bird-spotting judgments come out only randomly, or occasionally, true. This is a thinly disguised way of saying that the expert has acquired a reliable process for spotting birds (at least birds of type X); the novice has not acquired any such reliable process, although he lucked out with his present guess. By my lights, evidentialism would be greatly improved if it availed itself of this ingredient of process reliabilism. Its capacity to illuminate cases of non-inferential well-foundedness could thereby be much enhanced.
The foregoing diagnosis and recommendation also apply to the problem of introspective justifiedness. A well-known problem in this arena is Chisholm's (1942) problem of the speckled hen. Exactly which types of belief about one's own present experience are justified? Even if there is a determinate number of apparent speckles associated with a given visual experience, a subject who believes that the hen appears to have exactly 43 speckles will not necessarily be justified in so believing. That depends on how the subject deploys his introspective process and associated processes.
Psychologists give the label "subitizing" to a process of simply scanning a set of objects How can evidentialism cope with this problem? It could improve its handling of these cases by abandoning the simultaneity requirement, the requirement that justifying evidence must be possessed at the same time as the belief. But this requirement is a core part of internalism, to which mentalist evidentialism adheres. In any case, how much would it help evidentialism to follow the above advice and abandon the simultaneity requirement? It would still have to add a rule or condition to mark preservative memory as a justification-transmitting feature. It would be extremely ad hoc to simply add such a rule or condition without offering a rationale for it. Why, epistemologists are entitled to ask, does this sort of memory process qualify as a justification transmitter? This calls for explanation, and evidentialism has little in its toolbox to offer. What would improve evidentialism's explanatory prospects on this topic is to borrow two basic ingredients of process reliabilism. These ingredients are (1) the epistemological importance of beliefforming or belief-retaining processes, and (2) the importance of their reliability (or conditional reliability). Preservative memory is a cognitive belief-retaining process that is able to transmit justifiedness from an earlier to a later time. This is why Ichabod is still (substantially) justified in believing Q at noon although he has no evidence at noon that this belief fits. Moreover, reliabilism has a plausible-looking explanation of why preservative memory is justification transmitting, namely, its conditional reliability.
Belief outputs of preservative memory at later times are mostly true if its inputs at earlier times were true (see Goldman, 1979 , for a discussion of conditional reliability). 7 It is not clear how evidentialism can accommodate any of this within its existing (pure) fittingness story, which is why it needs a "rescue" by reliabilism.
Some readers might not find my treatment of Ichabod persuasive. I stipulated that
Ichabod has no other beliefs at noon that provide adequate evidence either for or against Q. But is this plausible, really? A critic might argue as follows. Won't anybody in Ichabod's situation have general beliefs both about the quality of his memory and about the quality of his usual belief-forming processes? Won't he typically believe -and believe justifiably -that his memory is quite good and that he usually forms beliefs in a justifiable fashion? So, if he finds himself remembering that Q and takes account of these background (justified) beliefs, won't this justify him in believing Q without any reliance on his original evidence? So there is no need to advert to his forgotten evidence to account for his justifiedness.
The case just described may well be a typical one, but it isn't the only possible case. So let us consider a different scenario. Suppose Ichabod is being treated by a clinical psychologist, who falsely persuades him that his once-robust memory is no longer working well; so he has no reason now for supposing that a stored belief of his We might supplement this last point by noticing another way to understand the critic's intuitions without conceding his central claim. His central claim is that the deceived Ichabod is (definitely) unjustified in believing Q. I am not prepared to concede this (intuitively). On the other hand, I may be prepared to concede a related thesis, namely, that Ichabod is unjustified in believing that he is justified in believing Q. Since
Ichabod believes (albeit falsely) that he no longer enjoys the same powers of memory that he once had, he is not justified in believing (upon reflection) that his current belief in Q is justified. In other words, he lacks second-order justifiedness with respect to Q. It does not follow from this, however, that he lacks first-order justifiedness; i.e., it does not follow that he is not justified in believing Q. As a general matter, being justified in believing that one is justified in believing p does not entail being justified in believing p (JJp ≠> Jp). Similarly, being unjustified in believing that one is justified in believing p does not entail that one is unjustified in believing p (~JJp ≠> ~Jp). We might concede that (~JJp) is always a defeater for Jp, but this is not incompatible with there being defeasible factors working in favor of Jp. Indeed, my contention is that Ichabod's sound acquisition of Q in the past and his retention of Q via reliable preservative memory are both factors that work (defeasibly) in favor of his being justified with respect to believing Q. Even if these defeasible factors are overridden by Ichabod's other current beliefs --a debatable matter --this would not save evidentialism from the current critique. The provisionally conceded defeat of his justifiedness with respect to Q still allows factors prior to t to be (positively) relevant to the justificational status of his belief at t (i.e., noon), contrary to the thesis of evidentialism.
Toward a Two-Component Theory of Inferential Justification
In this section I return to the ecumenical project of proposing that reliabilism should incorporate something like the evidential element emphasized by evidentialism.
Earlier versions of process reliabilism tried to make do with the reliability of cognitive processes as the linchpin. To be sure, it has never hesitated to invoke mental states, both doxastic and non-doxastic states, in its set of resources (Goldman, 1979 (Goldman, , 1986 The attraction of a two-component approach seems especially obvious in inferential justification. Let us see how it would work by first replacing the familiar tripartite framework of doxastic attitudes--belief, disbelief, and suspension-with the richer framework involving degrees of credence or subjective probabilities. Next let us assume that for any ordered pair of propositions (P, Q), there is some relation of degree of support or confirmation that takes values on the unit interval. Next, assume that P expresses S's total doxastic evidence relevant to Q, i.e., the total evidence vis-à-vis Q possessed in doxastic form, 8 and that S has no non-doxastic evidence relevant to Q.
Finally, assume that the degree of confirmation P confers on Q is N; in other words, C(Q, P) = N. Then it is plausible to hold that doxastic attitude of degree N toward proposition Q is precisely the attitude that fits his evidence for Q. In other words, if C(Q, P) = 0.63, then adopting the degree of credence, or subjective probability, 0.63 would fit the (total) evidence consisting of P. For an evidentialist about justification, the doxastic attitude a person in the foregoing conditions is justified in having vis-à-vis Q is 0.63 (and nothing else).
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This account is squarely in the spirit of the fittingness approach; it contains no trace of processism (thus far). The need for a process-based evaluation can be motivated, however, as follows. Shirley is very poor at determining confirmation relations. When she reflects on her total set of beliefs relevant to a hypothesis, she typically draws a blank about the strength of confirmation. She then hazards a wild guess about their degree of support for the hypothesis and forms that degree of belief in it. Proceeding in this fashion, Shirley assigns degree of belief 0.45 to a proposition H. Now consider Madeleine, a highly proficient confirmation theorist. Madeleine has exactly the same evidence vis-à-vis H as Shirley does. She uses her accurate, well-honed skills at determining degrees of support and arrives at the conclusion that her evidence for H is 0.45. She therefore assigns degree of belief 0.45 to H. Now, on one dimension of justifiedness -the fittingness dimension -Shirley and Madeleine's doxastic attitudes vis-à-vis H deserve the same rating. Equally clearly, however, there is another dimension of justifiedness -call it the process dimension -on which their doxastic attitudes merit different ratings. Madeleine's degree of belief is much more aptly, or competently, chosen than Shirley's -despite the fact that they arrive at the same result. On this second dimension of justifiedness, Shirley's degree of belief is not at all justified or wellfounded, whereas Madeleine's degree of belief is very well-founded. A two-factor theory handles this case nicely. But no single-factor theory, of either the purely evidentialist or purely reliabilist sort, can do so. That's a good reason to promote a synthesis of the two.
In their recent paper, "Evidence," Conee and Feldman (2008) anticipate part of what I have just said. They anticipate the objection that assigning a belief or degree of belief as a function of the degree of logical or probabilistic support from one's total evidence does not suffice for justifiedness. They do not, however, explicitly consider endorsing any move toward a process factor to accommodate this objection. Instead they write:
A person may know some propositions that logically entail some proposition that the person scarcely understands and surely does not know to follow from the things she does know. The logical route from what she knows to this proposition may be complex and go beyond her understanding, or even the understanding of any person. In our view, the person is not then justified in believing the consequence, even though it is entailed by her evidence. It is noteworthy that, to become justified in believing the proposition, she has to learn something newnamely, its logical connection to her evidence. (2008: 94) Let us set aside the possibility that the subject scarcely understands the target proposition.
That feature needs separate attention. 10 The main problem, correctly identified in this passage, is that even entailment by the evidence does not suffice to make the subject justified in believing the target proposition (call it "H"). What is Conee and Feldman's solution? Initially it appears that they seek to solve the problem by adding a requirement that the subject knows the logical connection between the evidence propositions and H.
This invites two worries. First, knowledge of a logical (or, more generally, probabilistic) connection does not seem to be necessary for being justified in believing H. They themselves concede this in the following section of their paper. People do not have to learn principles of logic or logical theory (and similarly for probability theory) to come to be justified in believing on the basis of logically or probabilistically supportive evidence.
Second, how would an acquisition of principles of logic or probability help solve the problem? Unless the subject applies appropriate processes, or operations, to the newly learned principles to form a belief in H, he will still fail to have a justified belief. At least this is so if we are discussing doxastic justifiedness (well-foundedness), as I am doing here. 11 Where well-foundedness is in question, causal processes of belief-formation (and belief-retention) cannot be brushed under the rug. That is why a two-factor theory, which includes a process dimension, is needed.
Ultimate and Derivative Evidence
In this section I consider the kinds of states that qualify as evidential states according to Conee and Feldman and the fittingness relation that is supposed to hold between them and justified doxastic attitudes. Conee and Feldman write:
The justificatory status of a person's doxastic attitudes strongly supervenes on the person's occurrent and dispositional mental states, events, and conditions. Thus, mental states, events and conditions, according to Conee and Feldman, exhaust the evidence (evidential states) that a person ever has, in the preferred sense of evidence they clarify in "Evidence" (Conee and Feldman, 2008 12 An epistemologically more plausible view is that preservative memory of this kind suffices (absent defeaters) to transmit justifiedness from the earlier period. The epistemic role of preservative memory also explains how the evidential status of a belief held at t can partly derive from earlier experiences without positing event memories, at t, of such earlier experiences. Thus, the SCE thesis is not well supported.
Internalism and the Historicity of Justifiedness
The failure of the SCE thesis and the importance of preservative memory in a satisfactory account of justifiedness pose a serious problem for evidentialism, especially the internalist element in evidentialism. This is so for two reasons. First, the failure of the SCE thesis and the epistemic significance of preservative memory demonstrate the general historicity of justifiedness (see Goldman 2009 for more detail). Although there may be some cases in which a doxastic attitude's justificational status is wholly determined by events occurring at its own doxastic decision time, t, in general an attitude's justificational status is partly determined by events and states before t. Hence, an attitude's justificational status does not supervene on mental states occurring at t. This is incompatible with Feldman and Conee's evidentialism. According to their principle EJ, it will be recalled, an attitude's justificational status is said to depend on the evidence the subject has at t. This is too restrictive. Earlier evidence is also relevant to justifiedness.
It is not just earlier evidence that is relevant. Earlier processes leading to the belief can also be relevant. Preservative memory is one such process. Suppose S originally formed a justified belief that P based on perceptual experiences of his between t o and t 1 . At a later time, t n , S also believes that P. Is S's belief that P at t n also justified?
That depends on how S arrived at this belief state at t n . Suppose that the t n -belief in P is the product of preservative memory operating from time t 1 , and S has encountered no defeating evidence of P during the interim. Then his P-belief at t n is presumably justified.
By contrast, suppose S totally forgets P at some point after t 1 , but comes to believe it once again at t n for entirely frivolous, or spurious, reasons. Then S's P-belief at t n is unjustified. Thus, which causal process leads to the (dated) belief is crucially relevant.
Evidentialism seems to ignore causal processes. In discussing the evidence that a doxastic attitude must fit in order to be justified, Conee and Feldman (especially in Conee and Feldman, 2008) It emerges from these points that the fittingness relation should hold less appeal to internalists than it initially appeared. This may not matter to Feldman and Conee, who in do not accept Chisholm's accessibilism. For accessibility internalists, however, the above discussion is quite pertinent, insofar as it suggests that the fittingness relation is a less promising piece of armor for defending their cause than they might imagine.
This point is independent of the many complications that would be encountered in trying to work out a determinate fittingness relation that meets Feldman and Conee's desiderata -an enormous problem given the special difficulty of balancing the respective roles for current experience and current beliefs. However, since I am tentatively prepared to sign on to the notion of a fittingness relation (as indicated in section 4), I won't say that it cannot be done. The question I have mainly addressed in this section is whether a well-specified fittingness relation would be such a major victory for internalism. I have argued in the negative.
Experiential Evidence: Toward a Two-Component Theory
As indicated at the outset, one aim of this paper is to explore the prospects for a hybrid theory of justification that combines the strengths of reliabilism and evidentialism.
Thus far, however, rather limited steps have been taken toward embracing evidentialist themes. The main such step (in section 4) was to advocate a two-factor theory of inferential justification, in which one factor is a belief's fittingness relation to the subject's doxastic evidence. Should reliabilism go a step further and acknowledge an analogous role for fittingness with non-doxastic evidence, for cases of non-inferential justification? This is what Comesana recommends in his proposed synthesis. He motivates this move in response to the oft-cited counterexamples to reliabilism offered by BonJour (1985) and Lehrer (1990) . The examples of Norman the clairvoyant (BonJour) and Mr. Truetemp (Lehrer) purport to demonstrate the non-sufficiency of reliability for justifiedness. Comesana's diagnosis of these cases is that the subject lacks any evidence -especially experiential evidence -on which his belief is based. Nonetheless, the beliefs in these cases are all reliably caused. So reliabilism must classify them as justified --a mistaken classification according to most commentators. Comesana therefore proposes a strengthened sufficiency condition according to which a belief is justified if it is caused by a reliable process that includes some evidence. We earlier acknowledged a need for However, even if we agree with Lyons that experience is inessential for basic perceptual justifiedness and that a different explanation of the clairvoyance and Truetemp cases is possible (without abandoning reliabilism), this does not demonstrate that all is well with reliabilism's treatment of experience. Few epistemologists would deny that people have both perceptual and memorial experiences, and it is reasonable to expect such experiences to play a distinctive role in justification. The one traditional epistemology that ignores or downplays the evidential role of experience is coherentism, and its standing in epistemology takes a hit precisely because of this feature. Reliabilism shows no comparable opposition to a role for experience, but it does little to highlight or acknowledge such a role. Its silence about experiential evidence is, at a minimum, a noticeable lacuna.
Here is a specific argument to motivate a substantive role for experiential states in a theory of justification, an argument from defeaters. Sidney inferred it would be sunny this afternoon from what he read in this morning's newspaper. On the basis of this evidence, he continues to believe an updated version of this proposition -namely, that it is sunny right now (in the middle of the afternoon) --despite the fact that he is walking in the middle of a rainstorm. Surely his current perceptual experience is a defeater for this belief; he is not justified in believing that it is sunny right now. But he has used no belief-forming or belief-revising process that takes this perceptual experience as an input;
he just ignores this experience. It appears, then, that there is no process we can appeal to -at least no instantiated process -to account for the defeat of his sunniness belief. If we
want to say what defeats Sidney's current justification for his sunniness belief, the obvious candidate is his perceptual experience. Moreover, it is natural to say that this justification-undermining experience is a piece of evidence he possesses.
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In section 4 I offered a two-factor approach to inferential justification in which doxastic evidence occupied a central role. A similar move is in order with respect to experiential evidence, in light of the foregoing argument from defeat (among other things). So, an analogous two-component approach to non-doxastic justification (that is, justification that rests on non-doxastic states) is in order, in which perceptual and memorial experience would occupy a central role. Let us concentrate on perceptual experience.
To construct a two-factor theory of perceptual justification we need an account of perceptual "fittingness" to provide the first factor. A preliminary question is how to construe perceptual states. Presumably they are not doxastic states; but might they still be contentful, or representational, states? To remain in the vicinity of Feldman's (2003) approach to perceptual justification, we would have to interpret them as being Without resolving this issue, let us turn to the question of fittingness. How could a doxastic attitude toward a proposition "fit" an experiential state, assuming that both have content (whether the same or different kinds of content)? In the case of inferential fittingness, we proposed that the relevant relation is that the truth of the contents of the premises should make probable the truth of the content of the conclusion. Perhaps the same idea can work here. Perhaps we can say that a belief in proposition p fits the evidence provided by experiential state E just in case the truth of the content of E makes (highly) probable the truth of p.
We can illustrate this idea with the help of a particular proposal in vision science for how beliefs about visible objects are formed based on visual representations of shape. 16 According to this proposal, the visual system represents object shapes in terms of parts constructed out of geometrical "ions" (elements), called geons. Geons are members of a family of representations of volumetric shapes that can be modeled as generalized cones, i.e., volumes swept out by a cross-section moving along an axis. A typical geon is a cylinder. Groups of geons can be combined by relating several of them to one another in ways familiar from tinkertoy sets. A combination of geons plus selected relations among them (e.g., "side-attached") can be recognized as familiar kinds of objects, such as a chair, a giraffe, a mushroom, or a pail.
representation, and that, in normal circumstances, a specific geonic combination G is tokened only when a giraffe is present. Then the truth of a G-token's content makes it highly probable that the proposition "A giraffe is in the vicinity" is true. Hence, it is fitting for a subject to believe the latter proposition when a G-representation is tokened.
This, then, is an adaptation of the evidentialist notion of fittingness to the case of visual experiential evidence, thus making fittingness one suitable factor, or component, of experience-based justification.
If we stop here, of course, we have a purely evidentialist account of experiential justification. It doesn't resemble an evidentialist-reliabilist hybrid of the sort I have been touting. Must we add a process-reliability component to obtain a more satisfactory account? Yes. Otherwise, we won't cover all the necessary bases. In particular, we won't have a satisfactory account of doxastic as opposed to propositional justifiedness (i.e., well-foundedness) in this domain.
Obviously, to have a justified belief that object x is an F, where the justification arises from shape perception, it is not enough that a geonic F-representation is tokened in the subject's head while he forms the indicated belief. This condition might be met even by the novice bird-watcher in Feldman's example (see section 2 above) who should not be credited with a justified belief. The novice bird-watcher might even undergo a tokening of the same geonic representation of the pink-spotted fly-catcher as the expert bird-watcher undergoes. In that case, the fittingness condition will be satisfied by both of them if it is satisfied by one. But, intuitively, it is still possible that one should be justified and the other unjustified (as Feldman recognizes).
17 Biederman (1987 Biederman ( , 1990 , the leading proponent of the geonic approach to visual object-recognition, gives us the materials for explaining the difference between the two bird-watchers in terms of the geon theory. Biederman says that subjects construct "object-models" for a large number of object names in English, where each "objectmodel" is a particular geonic configuration of specific geons and relations between them.
Many object types require several models each, both because different models are required for different viewing orientations and because some names or concepts have more than one configuration associated with them. For example, lamps come in different configurations, and there are several types of pianos (grand, baby-grand, upright, and spinet) each of which has a distinctive geonic configuration. Biederman hypothesizes that people store (geonic) object-models in memory where they are linked to object names or concepts. Then, when they have a visual experience, they automatically try to match a geonic configurations tokened in visual consciousness with one of the geonic configurations stored in memory. When such a "match" is secured, the system recognizes (or judges) the perceived object as an F, where F is the label or concept paired with the recovered object-model.
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Presumably, this matching process would be the kind of process used by the expert bird-watcher, who has a stored geonic object-model for the pink-spotted flycatcher. If his classification of the bird as a pink-spotted fly-catcher is the product of a matching process of the indicated kind --more specifically, a matching process with a high threshold or standard for a match (see note 18) --he uses a very reliable process of classification, or belief-formation. So this would satisfy a process-reliabilist condition of the kind I mean to incorporate into our hybrid account. The novice bird-watcher, by contrast, would not be using such a reliable process. His lack of training suggests that he has not constructed a suitable object-model for the pink-spotted fly-catcher, and therefore does not secure much of a "match" at all between his visual experience and a stored object-model of the fly-catcher. Hence, he is just guessing when he classifies the bird as a fly-catcher, and guessing is not a reliable process.
I propose, then, in parallel with the proposal of section 4, that experiential justifiedness is a function of two factors, or components. One factor says that belief in a proposition is prima facie justified in experiential terms only if the belief fits with the subject's current experiential evidence. 19 The second factor says that an experiencebased belief is justified only if it is the product of a reliable experience-based process.
The two-factor theory says that an experiential belief is fully justified (doxastic considerations aside) only if it is justified in terms of both factors. This two-factor approach to experience-based justifiedness, which marries the requirement of evidential fittingness with production by a reliable process, has significant attractions, I have argued.
The Source of Epistemic Principles (Best Explanationism)
In their recent paper "Evidence," Conee and Feldman (2008) Goldman (1999) under the label "veritistic value" (although that theory is not directed at justifiedness per se). Conee and Feldman, of course, seek an internalist criterion or rationale. The one they propose in "Evidence" is the criterion of "best explanations."
Here is how they put it:
We believe that the fundamental epistemic principles are principles of best explanation. Perceptual experiences can contribute toward the justification of propositions about the world when the propositions are part of the best explanation of those experiences that is available to the person. Similarly, the truth of the contents of a memory experience may be part of the best explanation of the experience itself. Thus, the general idea is that a person has a set of experiences, including perceptual experiences, memorial experiences, and so on.
What is justified for the person includes propositions that are part of the best explanation of those experiences available to the person. Likewise, one's inferences justify by identifying to one further propositions that either require inclusion in one's best explanation for it to retain its quality or enhance the explanation to some extent by their inclusion. (2008: 98) Unfortunately, there are a number of counterexamples to this approach, plus the worry that best explanation is itself subservient to a different rationale, namely true belief acquisition. I turn first to the counterexamples. It should be emphasized that the success of even a single counterexample among the three offered below would suffice to make my critical case. All the counterexamples would have to be successfully resisted to overcome this line of criticism. (B) Preservative Memory. As reviewed above, a satisfactory theory of justifiedness needs a principle of preservative memory. If S was justified in believing P earlier, and S retains her belief in P now via preservative memory, then S is prima facie justified in believing P now. Like introspection, however, preservative memory lacks any type of mental experience or episode that invites explanation. In particular, there is no (conscious) act of "recollection" that invites explanation. An epistemic principle that covers preservative memory, then, cannot be rationalized by the best-explanation approach.
(C) Arithmetic Inference. I think there are two squirrels on my deck, and I think there are two birds. So I infer that there are (at least) four animals. Presumably, this arithmetic inference is justified. Is it a case of explanatory inference? Surely not.
How does there being four animals explain there being two squirrels and two birds? It doesn't. Still, here is a justified belief that some epistemic principle must cover. But that principle, in turn, cannot be grounded in terms of best explanation.
In each of these cases, the best-explanation account does not work. (Or, more cautiously, it does not work in some of them.) At the same time, each is very plausibly accommodated by process reliabilism. The belief that one has a tickle sensation is justified because introspection is a reliable process. Preservative memory contributes to justification because preservative memory is a conditionally reliable process.
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Arithmetic inference (of the right sort) is justifying because it is a conditionally reliable process. Thus, process reliabilism does a better job of accounting for the justifiedness "data" than best-explanationism.
In addition to these counterexamples, we should reflect on why inference-to-thebest-explanation is often a good pattern of non-deductive inference. I submit that it is a good pattern (where it is) because it is conducive to true belief. So, even if the inferenceto-the-best-explanation rationale were accepted, there is still a deeper rationale of an externalist variety. In defending this thesis, I don't wish to appeal to the argument that no explanation genuinely explains anything unless it is true. That is doubtless correct in one sense of 'explain'. However, people like Conee and Feldman who invoke inference-tothe-best-explanation must mean 'explain' to be understood in some non-truth-entailing sense of 'explain' (whatever that sense is, exactly). As dyed-in-the-wool internalists, they would not want a fundamental rationale of theirs to appeal directly to truth considerations. Suppose, then, that "superior explanatoriness" is not defined in terms of truth-conduciveness. Nonetheless, I submit, superior explanatoriness strikes us as a rationalizing property of a type of inference only because superior explanatoriness is, in general, an excellent indicator of truth. In other words, even if we accept superior explanatoriness as a mark (only one mark, not a universal mark) of justification, its being such a mark derives from its correlation with truth-conduciveness. The most fundamental principle of epistemic justification, then, is truth conduciveness --as reliabilism, of course, maintains.*
